Jonas Mohamed Osman Abdelghafour, known as Yonas Osman

Climate Risk

Climate-Risk Modelling for Banks and Insurers

Climate-risk modelling estimates how a changing climate and the policy response to it affect the financial position of banks and insurers. It differs from conventional risk modelling in three ways: the horizon is longer, the historical record is a weaker guide, and the outcome depends on policy choices that have not yet been made.

By Jonas Mohamed Osman Abdelghafour, known as Yonas Osman · Published · Reviewed · 4 min read

Catastrophe loss distribution with a heavy tail used in climate and hazard modelling — Climate-Risk Modelling for Banks and Insurers, analysis by Jonas Mohamed Osman Abdelghafour, known as Yonas Osman
Figure 1. Schematic loss distribution illustrating the tail behaviour discussed in this analysis.

Executive summary

  • Physical risk covers loss from hazards; transition risk covers loss from the shift to a lower-carbon economy.
  • The two are inversely related in scenario terms: rapid transition reduces long-run physical risk while increasing near-term transition risk.
  • Climate scenarios are conditional pathways without assigned probabilities, which limits how they can be used in capital measures.
  • Exposure data quality — location, construction, sector, counterparty operations — usually constrains results more than hazard modelling does.
  • The most defensible current use is comparative: identifying relative vulnerability rather than producing precise loss estimates.

Two channels, different mechanics

Physical risk arises from hazards: flood, windstorm, wildfire, drought, heat and sea-level rise, in both acute event form and chronic gradual form. It affects insurance claims, collateral values, borrower cash flows, business continuity and the insurability of particular locations.

Transition risk arises from policy, technology, market preference and litigation as economies decarbonise. It affects asset values, borrower creditworthiness in exposed sectors, stranded-asset potential and the viability of specific business models. Unlike physical risk, it is driven substantially by decisions rather than by physics, which makes it faster-moving and harder to project.

DimensionPhysical riskTransition risk
Primary driverHazard occurrence and intensityPolicy, technology and market shifts
Typical horizonImmediate to multi-decadeNear term to two decades
Data basisHazard, exposure and vulnerability dataEmissions, sector and counterparty data
Scenario sensitivityHigher in high-emissions pathwaysHigher in rapid-transition pathways
Main balance-sheet effectClaims, collateral, insurabilityAsset values, credit quality, revenue
Comparison of the two risk channels

The horizon problem

Financial planning operates over three to five years; most lending is shorter; most insurance contracts are annual. Climate effects accumulate over decades. This mismatch produces a genuine analytical difficulty and a frequent rhetorical error — concluding either that climate risk is irrelevant to short-horizon decisions or that it dominates them.

  • Long-dated exposures such as mortgages, infrastructure finance and life liabilities extend into the horizon where physical effects are material.
  • Transition effects can repricing rapidly in anticipation, so the market impact can arrive long before the physical change.
  • Annual insurance contracts reprice frequently, but the portfolio strategy, geographic footprint and reinsurance relationships behind them do not.
  • Adaptation, land-use change and building standards can alter the trajectory materially, in either direction.

Scenario analysis and its interpretation

Climate scenario frameworks describe internally consistent pathways for emissions, temperature, policy and technology. They are conditional narratives: if the world follows this path, these conditions follow. They do not come with probabilities, and assigning probabilities to them is a judgement the user makes, not a property of the scenario.

This matters for how the output can be used. A percentile-based capital measure requires a probability distribution. A scenario suite without probabilities supports comparison, vulnerability identification and strategic discussion, but cannot be converted directly into a capital number without an additional and clearly labelled judgement.

  1. Select a small number of scenarios spanning orderly transition, disorderly transition and limited action.
  2. Translate scenario variables into portfolio-relevant drivers: hazard frequency changes, carbon prices, sector demand, energy costs.
  3. Apply those drivers to counterparty and exposure data at the greatest granularity the data supports.
  4. Report relative results — which portfolios, sectors and locations are most affected — before reporting absolute loss estimates.
  5. State explicitly what is modelled, what is assumed and what is omitted.

Data is the binding constraint

Hazard models have improved substantially. Exposure data generally has not. Address-level geocoding accuracy, construction type, elevation relative to local flood defences, and the actual operating locations of corporate borrowers are frequently unknown or recorded at a granularity too coarse for hazard modelling to be meaningful.

  • Geocoding to postcode rather than to address can move a property across a flood boundary.
  • Counterparty emissions data is often estimated rather than reported, and indirect value-chain emissions are estimated with wide error.
  • Sector classifications are too coarse to distinguish a firm actively transitioning from a direct competitor that is not.
  • Improving exposure data usually yields more than refining the hazard model, and should be prioritised accordingly.

Practical example

A lender assesses a residential mortgage book under an assumed high-physical-risk pathway. Using postcode-level flood hazard, 4 per cent of the book appears in elevated-hazard zones. Re-running with address-level geocoding and local defence information, the figure changes to 6.5 per cent, and the identity of the affected properties changes substantially — some previously flagged properties are protected, while others not previously flagged are not.

The change in the headline percentage is modest; the change in which loans are affected is not. Since the decisions that follow — valuation adjustment, insurance verification, lending policy in specific areas — are property-specific, the data improvement was worth considerably more than a refinement of the hazard model would have been.

Limitations and caveats

  • Climate scenarios are conditional pathways without assigned probabilities and should not be presented as forecasts.
  • Downscaling global climate projections to local hazard involves substantial uncertainty that is often not carried through to financial output.
  • Adaptation and defence investment are difficult to project and are frequently omitted, which can overstate long-horizon physical loss.
  • Transition pathways depend on political decisions with no statistical basis for projection.
  • Model results are highly sensitive to exposure data quality, which is generally the weakest input.

Conclusion

Climate-risk modelling is at a stage where its comparative output is considerably more reliable than its absolute output.

Used to identify where a balance sheet is most vulnerable and to test strategic choices, it is valuable now. Presented as a precise multi-decade loss estimate, it claims a precision that neither the science nor the exposure data supports.

References

Author bio

Jonas Mohamed Osman Abdelghafour, known as Yonas Osman, actuary and financial risk professional

Jonas Mohamed Osman Abdelghafour, known as Yonas Osman is an actuary, FRM and financial risk professional specialising in banking, insurance, model risk, capital modelling and quantitative risk management.